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I. Introduction 
Adnominal Conditionals 
Peter Lasersohn 
University oj Rochester 
Consider the last sentence of the short text in ( 1 ) :  
( 1 ) OK, let's begin. We have a lot riding on this job, so please be very 
careful and make no mistakes. If we succeed at what we are trying to 
do, the benefits will be enonnous. But we all know the consequences 
if we fail. 
This sentence does not, in its most natural interpretation, mean the same thing as (2), 
where the arrow represents the material conditional: 
(2) We fail ..... we know the consequences 
Nor will it help to replace the material conditional with a modalized or relevant 
conditional operator, or with any other conditional operator. This sentence does not 
condition our knowledge of the consequences on our failure. Rather, it asserts that 
we do actually now know the consequences. Which consequences? The ones which 
would result, if we were to fail . 
Rather than analyzing this example as consisting of two clauses connected by 
if, I would like to suggest that the if-clause is an adnominal modifier, akin to a relative 
clause, and fonns part of the noun phrase the consequences ifwejail. 
This paper will explore the properties of such adnominal if-clauses, and 
present a semantic analysis for them. Naturally, we will want to relate ad nominal if­
clauses to if-clauses of the more familiar sort; I will suggest that this is best 
accomplished if we analyze sentences in general as involving reference to (or 
quantification over) sets of events, roughly as in Davidson ( 1 967). 
2. Position and Intonation of Conditional Clauses 
If conditional clauses really can appear adnominally, we should expect them to appear 
in certain environments unavailable to "ordinary" if-clauses. This does in fact tum out 
to be the case. Ordinary if-clauses occur most naturally either immediately before, or 
immediately after, their corresponding consequent clause : 1 
(3 )  a .  I f  you bother him long enough, John will give you five dollars. 
b .  John will give you five dollars, if you bother him long enough. 
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Ordinary if-clauses may also appear between the subject noun phrase of a sentence 
and the verb phrase, or after an auxiliary verb. In these cases, however, the if-clause 
is normally set offby parenthetical intonation, here represented by commas. If the if­
clause is not set apart in this way, it usually sounds quite unnatural : 
(4) a. John, if you bother him long enough, will give you five dollars. 
b. *John if you bother him long enough will give you five dollars. 
(5) a. John will, if you bother him long enough, give you five dollars. 
b .  *John will if you bother him long enough give you five dollars. 
However, we find that in certain cases, an if-clause may appear at the end of 
the subject noun phrase without parenthetical intonation: 
(6) a. The fine if you park in a handicapped spot is higher than the fine if your 
meter expires. 
b. The price if you pay now is predictable; the price if you wait a year is not . 
c. The outcome if John gets his way is sure to be unpleasant for the rest of 
us. 
Why isn't parenthetical intonation required for these examples? I would suggest that 
these examples represent a different construction from that illustrated in (4) and (5). 
Specifically, in (6) the if-clauses do not really appear between the noun phrase and the 
verb phrase at all, but rather are part of the noun phrase. Hence the rule that an if­
clause which appears between a subject noun phrase and its verb phrase must be set 
offby parenthetical intonation does not apply. 
Of course, one question which this raises is why the if-clause in (4)b. cannot 
also form part of the subject noun phrase. We will return to this question in Section 
7. 
Note also that even examples like those in (6) require parenthetical intonation 
if the if-c1ause appears after an auxiliruy verb, rather than at the end of a noun phrase : 
(7) a. The fine will, if you park in a handicapped spot, be higher than you want 
to pay. 
b .  *The fine will if you park in  a handicapped spot be higher than you want 
to pay. 
(8) a. The price can, if you pay now, be predicted; the price cannot, if you wait 
a year, be predicted . 
b .  *The price can i f  you pay now be  predicted; the price cannot i f  you wait 
a year be predicted . 
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(9) a. The outcome will, if John gets his way, be unpleasant for the rest of us. 
b.  *The outcome will if John gets his way be unpleasant for the rest of us. 
This pattern is what we expect on the suggested analysis; since the if-clause is 
separated from the subject noun phrase by an intervening auxiliary verb, it cannot 
form part of that noun phrase, and therefore cannot be exempt from the rule requiring 
parenthetical intonation. 
Because intonation correlates with the status of an if-clause as inside or 
outside the noun phrase in this way, we can use it as a guide to identifying adnominal 
if-clauses, as opposed to ordinary if-clauses in a post-noun-phrase position. This will 
be useful, because in some cases, even adnominal if-clauses do allow a paraphrase 
using an ordinary, adverbial if-clause. 
As a final piece of evidence for the existence of adnominal if-clauses, we note 
that if-clauses may also appear adjacent to either or both conjuncts in a coordinate 
noun phrase, as in ( 1 0), or between a noun and its relative clause, as in ( 1 1 ) :2 
( 1 0) The location if it rains and the location if it doesn't rain are within five miles 
of each other. 
( 1 1 )  The consequences if we fail that he mentioned are not nearly as bad as the 
consequences if we fail that he didn't mention. 
Note that in ( 1 0), neither if-c1ause takes scope over the rest of the sentence, but only 
over its own conjunct noun phrase. There seems no alternative in this construction 
to regarding the if-c1auses as forming part of the noun phrases. 
3. Adnominal Conditionals and Concealed Questions 
How can we analyze adnominal if-clauses semantically? One idea that seems natural 
after seeing examples like ( 1 2)a. is to claim that the noun phrase which contains the 
adnominal if-clause is rewritten at logical form as a "concealed question ." Then the 
if can be analyzed as the ordinary sentential connective if, giving a quite normal­
looking interrogative complement to the verb, as in ( I  2)b . : 
( 1 2) a. We all know the consequences if we fail .  
b .  We all know what the consequences will be if we fail .  
Unfortunately, as attractive as this idea i s  for examples like ( 1 2)a. , i t  i s  clearly 
inadequate for adnominal conditionals in general . This is easy enough to see simply 
by looking at some of our earlier examples, such as those in (6) or ( 1 0) .  These 
examples have no verb like know which could take an interrogative complement, so 
there does not seem to be any possibil ity of a concealed question analysis. 
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4. Adnominal Conditionals and Relational Nouns 
Another possible line of analysis would be to claim adnominal conditionals are 
actually complement clauses to their nouns. In this case we would take the if as a 
kind of complement marker. The advantage of such an analysis is that it brings out 
the synonymy of pairs like those in ( 13) and (14), though it also has the disadvantage 
of not showing what, if anything, adnominal if-clauses have to do with ordinary if­
clauses. 
( 1 3 )  a .  the consequences i f  we fail 
b. the consequences of our failure 
( 14) a. the fine if you park in a handicapped spot 
b. the fine for parking in a handicapped spot 
Semantically, we would take nouns like consequence or fine as relational, with one 
of the terms of the relation being an event or action, expressed by the if-clause or 
nominalization. 
Unfortunately, while this idea also has plausibility for some of our examples, 
it is implausible for others. In (6)b. ,  for instance, the if-clause certainly does not 
describe a service for which the price is imposed, or any other sort of event which 
might plausibly be a term of the price relation. So unlike the pairs in ( 1 3 )  and ( 1 4), 
the sentences in ( I 5) are not equivalent: 
( 1 5) a. the price if you pay now 
b. the price for paying now 
Note also that relational nouns may appear with both an overt complement 
and an adnominal if-clause : 
( 1 6) the consequences of our failure if John is in charge 
Or, consider the following scenario: The chairmanship of an important 
committee is going to be decided soon, and everyone is trying to guess who will be 
elected. John is known for his sexism, and has the deciding vote - but his credentials 
as a voting member of the committee are open to question In this situation, the 
sentences in ( 1 7) seem appropriate: 
( 1 7) a. The chair if John gets to vote is sure to be a man. 
b. You can imagine the chair if John gets to vote. 
Note that ( 1 7)a. does not require parenthetical intonation, and that ( I 7)b . is 
paraphrasable as "You can imagine the chair who will be elected if John gets to vote," 
and not as "If John gets to vote, then you can imagine the chair." But presumably we 
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do not want to analyze chair as denoting a relation which holds between a person (the 
chair) and the events which lead to that person taking office (e.g. John's voting). 
We may conclude that adnominal if-clauses do not, as a matter of general 
principle, appear as arguments to relational nouns. Instead, they appear as some sort 
of adjunct or modifier within the noun phrase. 
5. Adnominal Conditionals and Intensionality 
In most of our examples, the adnominal if-clause appears inside the scope of some 
sort of intensional operator, such as a modal auxiliary verb or adjective, attitude verb, 
etc. : 
( 1 8) a. We all know the consequences if we fail. 
b. The outcome if John gets his way is sure to be unpleasant. 
c. The chair if John gets to vote is sure to be a man. 
d. You can imagine the chair ifJohn gets to vote. 
Could it be that adnominal if-clauses are required to appear in an intensional context, 
that they are a kind of "modal polarity item"? 
Here again, the idea has some initial plausibility. Even in many of those 
examples which do not contain an overt intensional operator, a case could be made 
that there is some sort of implicit or hidden operator. The sentences in ( I 9), for 
example, have a kind of "generic" flavor to them: 
( 1 9) a. The fine if you park in a handicapped spot is higher than the fine if your 
meter expires . 
b .  The price if you pay now is quite high . 
Moreover, it might be claimed that they lack existential import : if no one ever parks 
in a handicapped spot, in some sense there is no fine for doing so . 
However, there are other examples in which it is clearer that an adnominal if­
clause is positioned in an extensional context . Suppose again that John holds the 
deciding vote for the chairmanship of the committee. Bill and Mary are discussing the 
probable outcome of the election. Mary has some idea of John's intentions, and says 
"The chair if John gets to vote is sure to be a man ." Bill happens to know that John 
is not only planning to vote for a man, but specifically planning to vote for him, and 
says (20) : 
(20) The chair if John gets to vote is sitting right here in front of you ! 
Presumably, is sitting right here infrant ajyou does not create an intensional context, 
so we cannot claim that adnominal if-clauses are limited to such contexts . 
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Nonetheless, it certainly appears that adnominaJ if-clauses appear in 
intensional contexts with greater than chance frequency, even if they are not strictly 
limited to such contexts. Our analysis ought to make clear why such contexts are 
"natural" ones for adnominal if-clauses. 
6. Adnominal Conditionals and Logical Form 
In developing a semantics for adnominal if-clauses, we must face the question of just 
how closely we want to tie their semantics to their syntax. I assume that the syntactic 
structure of noun phrases containing an adnominal if-c1ause is essentially as in (2 1 ) :  
(2 1 )  [Det [N if S]] 
But how seriously do we want to take this structure? 
One would like to hope we will take the syntax very seriously, but the 
question is worth raising, because an analysis will always be possible in which we 
appeal to a level of representation at which the structure is very different . In 
particular, I think in this case there is a temptation to "resolve away" this structure, 
in favor of a logical representation in which the if is a sentential connective linking 
whole clauses. 
For example, this was the basic strategy behind the idea which we rejected in 
Sect ion 3 , of treating the noun phrase as a concealed question. And although that 
idea did not generalize to a wide enough range of examples, there are other, similar 
approaches that might apply the same basic strategy more successfully. 
For example, we might analyze noun phrases containing adnominal if-clauses 
as being structured, at the level of Logical Form, like free relative clauses. In this 
case, we would assign the noun phrase in (22)a. a representation essentially like the 
free relative in (22)b . ;  we would assign the noun phrase in (23 )a. a representation 
essentially like the free relative in (23)b. ,  and so on: 
(22) a. the consequences if we fail 
b .  what(ever) the consequences would be if we fail 
(23 ) a. the chair if John gets to vote 
b. who(ever) the chair would be if John gets to vote 
Note that in these free relative clause constructions, the if-clause forms the 
antecedent of a larger conditional sentence, and is not a noun modifier any more at 
all. The ifis the ordinary ifwhich connects one clause to another. One may interpret 
it using whatever one's favorite theory of conditional sentences may be, and obtain an 
interpretation which is at least as sensible as what that theory assigns to other 
conditional sentences. 
The main cost in giving such an analysis is syntactic, not semantic :  we must 
give rules for converting noun phrases containing adnominal if-clauses into free 
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relative clauses in the mapping from surface syntactic representation to Logical Form 
- and we must try to justify such rules in the context of some well-developed 
syntactic theory. What we gain in such a move is a unified semantics for if, that treats 
it as meaning the same thing in both its ordinary and adnominal uses. 
It: on the other hand, we could give a unified analysis for if without invoking 
such rules, there would be little reason to adopt them. Especially if there were no 
independent motivation for them - no way in which they made the syntactic theory 
run more smoothly, for example - we should prefer to read the interpretation off a 
structure more like what the syntax seems to give us automatically. I believe such an 
analysis is possible, if we adopt the right view as to the semantics of sentences. 
7. The Semantics of Adnominal Conditionals 
Rather than reconstructing noun phrases containing adnominal if-clauses as free 
relative clauses, therefore, we shall consider a semantics based on something more 
like the surface form. In constructing such an analysis, we take as our starting point 
the possible worlds semantics for counterfactual conditionals as developed by 
Stalnaker ( 1 968) and Lewis ( 1973) :  
(24) S l  if S2 is true in a world w iff for all those worlds w' closest to w such that 
S2 is true in w' , S 1 is also true in w' . 
The "closest" worlds to a given world w are the ones most similar to it, according to 
some metric of similarity, which we leave vague. 
How can we adapt this for use with adnominal conditionals? We need a rule 
where S 1 is replaced with a noun, and where the entire construction is noun-like, 
rather than sentence-like, in its semantics. 
Relative to a possible world, a noun denotes a set of individuals, so we can 
give a rule like (25) : 3 
(25) [N ifS]M.w = {x E U I for all those worlds w' closest to w such that S is true 
in w' , x E [N]JM·w· } 
For example, chair if John gels 10 vole will denote, relative to a given world w, the 
set containing all those individuals who are chair in all the worlds in which John gets 
to vote, but which are otherwise as similar to w as possible .  (Note that w itself may 
be such a world, if John gets to vote in w. ) Assuming that John votes for the same 
person in all these most similar worlds, and assuming that we are pragmatically 
concerned here only with a single committee, this will presumably be a singleton set, 
and we may speak sensible of "the" chair if John gets to vote. 
A couple observations are in order : First, an individual x may be in the 
denotation of a phrase of the form [N if S] relative to w even ifx does not exist in w 
- so long as x exists in those worlds most similar to w in which S is true. For 
example, Ihe consequences if we fail may denote in w some group of "possible 
AoNOMINAL CONOmONALS 
-
events" - here taken as a species of individual - which exist in those worlds nearest 
w in which we fail, but which, if we are lucky, do not exist in w itself. I suspect this 
is the reason why adnominal if-clauses so often appear in intensional contexts; they 
have a semantics which makes it very easy for them to denote non-existent objects, 
and extensional predicates can never be true of non-existent objects, by definition. 
Second, because adnominal if-clauses exploit variation in denotation from 
world to world, it would make little sense to combine one with a rigid designator. 
Hence the use of an adnominal if-clause presupposes that its noun is not a rigid 
designator. I suspect that this is the reason why (4)b. is bad (though we might also 
write this off to a syntactic difference between common nouns and proper names); 
John denotes the same individual in all possible worlds, and certainly not a different 
individual in worlds where you bother him and worlds where you don't . 
Note also that (25) calls for universal quantification over (closest) worlds. 
This may just be a default. It is a familiar fact about ordinary if-clauses that the exact 
type of quantification may indicated adverbially, and that a variety of entities other 
than worlds may be quantified over: 
(26) a. If John gets to vote, the consequences are usually regrettable. 
b. Occasionally, if you park in the wrong place, you must pay a fine. 
c. If it rains, one rarely must deal with sunstroke. 
It appears that the same points hold for adnominal if-clauses, except that the type of 
quantification is given adjectivally rather than adverbially : 
(27) a. the usual consequences if John gets to vote 
b. an occasional fine if you park in the wrong place 
c. a rare problem if it rains 
Perhaps examples like these would be better dealt with in the manner of Stump 
( 1 98 1 ), however; I leave this issue open 4 
8. Adnom inal Conditionals and Ord inary Conditionals 
The rule for adnominal conditionals in (25) is similar to the rule for ordinary 
conditionals in (24) - but not so similar that one can really feel comfortable claiming 
that we have given a "unified analysis ."  If we keep these two rules we are still in 
effect admitting that there are two distinct if operators, with related, but not identical, 
semantics. It would be preferable to give an analysis that really did treat both cases 
identically 
We can obtain such a unification if we adopt the view that sentences, at some 
level , are predicates of eventualities (that is, of events, states and processes). For 
example, we might interpret the sentence in (28)a. as corresponding at some level to 
the lambda-term in (28)b . : 
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(28) a, John arrived on Tuesday, 
b. le[arrive(i, e) & on(e, t)] 
If desired, we may view (28)b. as corresponding to a prefinal stage in the semantic 
derivation for (28)a. , and complete the derivation by applying this lambda-term to a 
free variable and then binding it with an existential quantifier; this is the technique of 
Parsons ( 1990), and gives the standard Davidsonian logical forms. More simply, we 
may just regard a sentence as true if its denotation is non-empty, and false if it is 
empty,s 
Once we adopt the view of sentences as predicates of eventualities, they begin 
to look surprisingly similar to common nouns and other predicates of individuals. 
This makes it possible to revise the semantics for ordinary if-c1auses, to bring it more 
into line with semantics for adnominal if-clauses. Specifically, let us now assume that 
ordinary if links one event predicate to another, to yield a third, complex event 
predicate. In this case, we can give a rule like (29), to replace (24) :6 
(29) [S I if S2]M,w = {x E U I for all those worlds W i  closest to w such that there 
exists some y E [S2]M,w', it holds that x E [S I]M,W' } 
For example, what eventualities will be denoted in a given world w by the sentence 
Bill would become chair, if John voted? Look in the nearest worlds to w in which 
there is an event of John voting; if in all those worlds there is also an event of Bill 
becoming chair, these events of Bill becoming chair will be the ones denoted by the 
sentence as a whole in w. If there are no such events, the sentence will denote the 
empty set . The sentence is true in the former case, false in the latter. 
Now let us return to our rule for adnominal conditionals, in (25) .  Given our 
assumptions so far, this is equivalent to (30): 
(30) [N if S]M,w = {x E U I for all those worlds W i closest to w such that there 
exists some y E [s]M,w', it holds that x E [N]M,w' }  
But this differs from (29) only in the syntactic category labels; the semantics is 
identical . We can collapse both rules into a single one: 
(3 1 )  [X if S]M,w = { x  E U I for all those worlds W i closest to w such that there 
exists some y E [s]M,w' ,  it holds that x E [x]M,W' } 
This gives us a unified definition for if, which can handle both adnominal and ordinary 
conditionals, without syntactically unpacking noun phrases into sentences, simply 
because they contain an if-clause. 
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9. Event Logic and Sentential Connectives 
Our analysis treats if, when it links two clauses, as linking two predicates of 
eventualities. But either or both of the clauses linked by if may itself be a complex 
clause, built up from smaller clauses by conjunction, disjunction, or negation: 
(32) a. Things will be bad, if we fail and no one bothers to help us. 
b. You must pay a fine, if you park in a handicapped spot or your meter 
expires. 
c. I will not remain on this committee, if John gets to vote. 
In order to account for examples like these in an analysis like that presented here, we 
must allow sentences formed via conjunction, disjunction, or negation to function as 
predicates of eventualities. In effect, we must reconstruct propositional logic at the 
level of eventuality predicates. 
This is not too difficult, though it is a large enough step that I suspect some 
people will hesitate at it. But I would point out that the truth functional connectives 
are not the only sentential connectives in English or in any other natural language; 
they belong to a larger class which includes such items as before, after, because, and 
many others. Many of these other connectives, like if, have adnominal uses; and most 
of them can be analyzed relatively straightforwardly in terms of relations among 
events. It would be nice to treat this entire class in a uniform way, and have the truth­
functionality of and, or, etc . fall out as a consequence, rather than being stipulated 
directly in a truth table or its equivalent . 
There is, moreover, independent evidence that sentential conjunction, at least, 
should be interpreted as an operation on eventuality predicates; see Lasersohn ( 1 992, 
1 995) for extended arguments to this effect . We do not review these arguments here 
but simply suggest the rule in (33), where 'e+e" represents the "group," or plurality, 
whose members are e and e ' :  
Assuming that i f  e+e ' exists iff  e and e '  exist, this rule gives the result that S 1 and S2 
is true iff S 1 is true and S2 is true; the standard truth table fal ls out naturally 
For disjunction, we use the simple rule in (34) 
It should be easy to verifY that this also gives the effect of the standard truth table. 
The case of negation is slightly complicated . If a sentence like John is 
standing is false - that is, if its denotation is empty - the analysis requires us to find 
some eventual ity of which the sentence John is nol slanding is true. What is this 
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eventuality? Perhaps it is just a state of John not standing. It certainly seems true that 
if John is sitting, for instance, then he is in a state of not standing. In the long run, I 
think something like this is probably necessary. But for our purposes here, we can 
keep the analysis simpler, and avoid a commitment to negative states, if we simply 
assume that if there is no eventuality of John standing, then John is not standing is 
true of every eventuality: 
(35) e E [not s]M,w iff[S]M,w = 0 
This again gives a result like that of the standard truth table: not S is true iff S is false. 
It is perhaps worth noting that although S is true iff not not S is true, S and not not 
S will not normally have the same denotation. 
10. Conclusion 
We have explored some of the properties of adnominal if-clauses, and given a 
semantic analysis based on the modal treatment of ordinary if-clauses advocated by 
Stalnaker and Lewis. This was done without assigning logical forms in which if 
always Iink:s whole sentences; interpretation was read from structures closer to what 
can be justified on syntactic grounds. 
A unified semantic analysis of adnominal and ordinary if-clauses may be 
obtained if sentences are treated as predicates of eventualities; this allows us to treat 
ordinary if-clauses on the model of adnominal if-c1auses. Such an analysis requires 
an eventuality-based interpretation of the other sentential connectives as well, 
providing independent support for the eventuality-based approach to conjunction 
advocated in Lasersohn ( I 992, 1 995) .  
Endnotes 
*Thanks to the University of Rochester for supporting a leave of absence, during 
which the initial version of this paper was written, and to Tel Aviv University for 
hosting me during my leave This paper was presented informally to the Israel 
Semantics Circle in 1 995;  thanks to them, to the audience at SALT and to Chris 
Barker and Nirit Kadmon for helpful comments. Remaining errors are my own, of 
course. 
I Ordinary if-clauses and adnominal if-clauses should both be distinguished from if­
clauses of the kind illustrated in (i) :  
(i) I don't know if John is awake. 
The ifhere is similar to whether; this is not a conditional construction. 
2Thanks to Chris Barker and Anita Mittwoch for these examples. 
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31 assume that interpretation is relative to a model M = (U, W, F), where U is a set of 
possible individuals, W is a set of possible worlds, and F is a function assigning 
denotations in the usual way. We allow that a given individual may "exist" at more 
than one world, and at some worlds but not others. 
4It is perhaps worth considering whether adnominal if-clauses involve universal 
quantification over worlds even as a default - after all, John might vote for a 
different person in each of the nearest possible worlds. But I think it is precisely for 
this reason that universal quantification is called fOf. Suppose that in one of the 
closest worlds he votes for Bill, and in another equally close world he votes for Fred. 
In this case we do not want either of (i) or (ii) to be true: 
(i) The chair if John gets to vote will be Bill . 
(ii) The chair if John gets to vote will be Fred. 
We can obtain the correct results here if we require universal quantification. 
Note that even with universal quantification, we can obtain a kind of "non­
specific" reading in sentences like (iii), because the adjective sure adds an extra layer 
of modalization. 
(iii) The chair if John gets to vote is sure to be a man. 
We assume that the logical structure here is something like sure( q» ,  and is true 
relative to a world w iff q> is true relative to all those worlds w' which are compatible 
with what we are sure of in w. Now from each of these "sureness" worlds, we look 
at all the closest worlds in which John gets to vote. This might be a different set with 
respect to each sureness world, yielding a different person as chair. Hence (iii) will 
not entail that there is a particular man who is sure to be chair if John gets to vote. 
Thanks to Mats Rooth for raising this issue. 
S Another alternative is to claim that statements make demonstrative reference to an 
eventuality rather than existentially quantifYing over them, as in Austin ( 1 950) or 
Barwise and Perry ( 1 983); in this case we simply apply the lambda term in (28)b. to 
whatever eventuality is demonstratively referred to in an utterance of (28)a. 
Combined with the rules we give below, however, this technique requires us to make 
sense of the idea of making demonstrative reference to events which take place only 
in other possible worlds - an idea that for some reason seems more objectionable 
than existentially quantifYing over such events. 
6w e assume that events are a species of individual, hence elements of U in our model . 
165 
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